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THE LAW OF THE TELEPHONE.
The telephone is the product of an age of remarkable inven-
tions. It is still a new institution and while some legal questions
concerning it are decided, others will depend upon the progress
of electrical science for their final adjudication.
The "telephone" belongs to the genus "telegraph." Not
only from the similarity of their electrical principles, but especially
from their similar relations to the public, must the law class them
together. In Attorney General v. Edison Telegraph Co., 6 Q. B.
Div. 244, it was held that a conversation through a telephone was
a "message," or at all events "a communication transmitted by
telegraph," and therefore a telegram within the meaning of the
English Telegraph Acts. Indeed, the definition given by Morse
of his electro-magnetic telegraph forms a perfect definition of the
telephone. He called it "an- instrument or apparatus which by
means of wires conducting the electric fluid, conveys intelligence
to any given distance with the velocity of lightning." 1
In short, while technically the telephone refers to an instrn-
ment which transmits the voice of the speaker,2 it is so closely re-
lated to the telegraph that the statutes will, in the absence of
special controlling conditions, extend the law of telegraphy to
include telephones: 8
From the nature of its service the telephone has assumed a
position as public agent. As a time-saving factor in commerce it
stands next to the telegraph. The initiation, progress and com-
pletion of business transactions involving immense interests,
depends upon the certainty of telephonic communication.
4 But
where property has thus from the nature of its employment come
to be of public consequence and affects the community at large, it
ceases to bejurisprivati and becomes clothed with a public inter-
est.5 Special privileges and special obligations follow as a result
of such a legal status, and therefore from the nature of its public
function we find the telephone affected by the rights and liabilities
1 Webster's Diet., "'Electro-magnetic telegraph."
2 Hockett v. State, x05 Ind. 250.
3 Bell Tel. Co. v. Com., 3 Atl. Rep. 825; 53 N. J. L. 341; 53 Ala. 21r.
4 17 Neb. 126. 5 Munn z. Ill., 94 U. S. 113.
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of a common carrier.6 Both the telegraph and the telephone,
except where they are merely for private convenience, undertake
for hire to carry news for any who choose to employ them. As
the telegraph has undertaken with the public for the rapid trans-
mission of despatches from its offices, so the telephone has under-
taken to transmit oral messages from its instruments, one of which
it proposes to supply to each party requiring it. Its chief right
against the public is that of eminent domain, 7 a right to which it,
like the telegraph, is entitled only by reason of its character as a
public use, and which it must exercise in deference to the highest
public good.
Telegraph law holds for telephones on questions where their
public status is identical, 8 but the peculiar nature of telephone ser-
vice has led to complications since the introduction of electric
railways, owing to the disturbances due to induction, conduction
and leakage.
Long before the introduction of steam and electricity it was
held that the primary object of a street was for the free passage
of the public, 9 a rule that seems to be followed in the cases of the
Central Pa. Telegraph Co. v. Wilkesbarre Ry. Co., i i Pa. Co. Ct.
Rep. 417, and R. R. Co. v. Teleph. Co., 27 N. E. Rep. 89o. In
the former it was held that a telephone company * * * must
not interfere with the free use of the street * * * and this duty
includes the precautions necessary to keep its wires from coming
in contact with those of a street railway subsequently occupying
the street. The second case dealt with the question of disturbance
to telephone wires caused by conduction and leakage, where both
companies used the ground to complete their circuit; and the
Court said that the prior occupation of the street by virtue of a
franchise from the city, did not give a telephone company the
right to enjoin an electric-railway company from locating its poles
and wires over the same street. Since both companies were law-
fully using their franchises, and the difficulty could be avoided if
either would abahdon the ground circuit and use a return wire, the
Court held that it was not a question of prior right of occupancy,
and that the telephone company had acquired no vested right to
the use of such ground circuit. The primary and dominant pur-
pose of the street is for public passage, and any occupation except
for travel or transportation is inferior to such public easement.
6 47 Fed. Rep. 433; 17 Neb. 126; 118 Ind. 194; 61 Vt. 461; 1o5 Ind. 250;
66 Md. 399. 7 Am. and Eng. Encyl. Law, 25, p. 747.
8 Am. and Eng. Encyl. Law, 25, p. 746.
9 King v. Russell, 6 East, 427.
THE LA W OF THE TELEPHONE.
As between two public uses, the more important takes precedence,
on the principal that the highest public good is the end of all law.
Injunction was therefore denied to the telephone company in
this and similar cases,10 and while further developments in electri-
cal sciende may alter the present status of these electrical compa-
nies, their duty to sacrifice private interests to the common good
must remain.
Rights and duties are correlative, and the telephone company,
by accepting the benefits of the law extending to it the right
of eminent domain, surrenders its system to the public, and
binds itself to render equal service to all, under proper and
reasonable regulations. 11 The duty of a common carrier as to im-
partiality is elementary law, having its foundation in public right,
which is superior to every private right. To illustrate the length
to which a court has gone to uphold this view, we may instance
the case of Cent. Union Telph. Co. v. State, ii8 Ind. i94, in
which it was held that, where the statute regulates the monthly
charges of telephone companies, even though a company has
abandoned the rental system and adopted a public toll system,
nevertheless any person within its district has the right to demand
and receive private telephone facilities.
The most interesting phase of this subject arises where the
telephone company holds patent rights of the government. Tele-
phones in this country are largely monopolized by the Bell com-
pany, which holds the patent rights and leases them to local cor-
porations; and, depending on the exclusive right of patentees to
make, use and vend their productions as secured by Federal laws,
they often attempt to boycott their rivals by stipulations in their
contracts of license. The cases, with one exception,
12 hold such
contracts void, and deny the right of the licensor to demand, or
the licensee to accept such conditions. There is here at first sight,
an apparent conflict of authority, -State laws abridging and
restricting the monopoly secured to an inventor under the national
patent laws; but in the words of an Ohio case,- "the use of
property-arising from discovery-is not beyond the control of
State legislation, simply because the patentee acquires a monopoly
in his discovery." 13 While enjoying the monopoly conferred by
his patent, he must exercise his rights therein, subject to the obli-
10 Cumberland Tel. Co. v. United Electric R. Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 273; Hud-
son River Telph. Co. v. Watervliet Turnpike Co., i2r N. Y. 397.
1147 Fed. Rep. 433; 17 Neb. 126; ii8 Ind. 194; 66 Md. 399.
12 49 Conn. 352. For views above see 47 Fed. Rep. 433; 17 Atl. Rep.
1o71; 97 U. S. 508, 509; 36 0. St. 296. 13 36 0. St. 296.
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gations imposed by the common and statute law. "If he leases
his product for a public rather than an individualuse he thereby
gives the use to the whole public." 14 This power of the State to
dictate rules to every sort of public business is discussed at length
in Munn v. Ill., 94 U. S. 113. In that case it is said that, "when
one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an inter-
est be must submit to be controlled by the public for the common
good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created." He
need not apply his property to a public employment, but if he does
the employment will be subject to the rules prescribed by law,
for it is the business as such and not the right to A patent monop-
oly that is regulated.15 The use of a patent can never be enforced
against the will of a patentee, but the telephone patent is of little
value except by being subjected to public use; and the owners
cannot hope to reap the benefits of such a use and escape its obli-
gations. The State, as we have seen, grants to the telephone
company the right of eminent domain, the right which is never
conferred on any but a public use; and the patent rights which it
possesses exclusively and may continue to hold exclusively if it
asks no State assistance, are waived, in so far as they are incon-
sistent with the new duties arising on the acceptance of such State
privileges.16
Like all common carriers the telephone company may establish
reasonable conditions which applicants must comply with; and
the use of profane or obscene language over a telephone may
justify a company in refusing further service, on the same ground
that a telegraph is not liable for a failure to send immoral or
gambling messages. 17
The party discriminated against by a telephone company can-
not bring an action at law, for there is no breach of contract; but
his remedy lies in a writ of mandamus,' 8 a mode of relief that will
avail even in the hands of a rival company, and which is not
abridged by the imposition of statutory penalty. 19
Finally, although State statutes have been referred to as enforc-
ing these duties to the public, they are only declarative of the
common law, by virtue of which the State police power has always
controlled public employments.2u
14 17 AtU. Rep. 1071.
15 Munn v. Ill., 96 U. S. X13. Teleph. Co. v. Delaware, 2 C. C. A. i.
1647 Fed. Rep. 433; 2 C. C. A. 1; 27N. E. Rep. 89o; C. U. Tel. Co. v.
State, 123 Ind. 113; 118 Ind. i4; 66 Md. 399; 36 0. S. 296.
17 Pugh v. City Tel. Co., 27 Alb. L. J. 163.
18 17 Neb. 126; 66 Md. 399; also see cases under note 6, su jra.
19 118 Ind. 194. 20 Hockett v. State, 105 Ind. 250; 17 Neb. 126.
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The same basic principles that determine the duties of a tele-
phone company to impartial service, also establish the right
of the State to regulate charges. It springs directly from
the State police power and is a common law right of regulating
public employments, which our constitution has left to the various
States. Though somewhat intangible and difficult to define,
owing to its various phases, this power is inherent in every sover-
eignty and embraces the entire system of internal State regula-
tions.21 "Sic utere Iuo ut alienum non laedas" is its controlling prin-
ciple; the legislature22 is its agent delegated to regulate the
charges of public employments to the end of preventing any un-
just discrimination, and if the legislature fails to do so, the court
must decide on reasonable rates. 2 But such power of regulation
is not a power to destroy-and does not do away with the right to
make reasonable charges, a right which exists under the general
law governing natural persons and not as a result of a special
franchise or privilege.24 In other words, the power of the legisla-
ture to regulate means the power to fix a maximum rate,25 -a
limit which a telephone company cannot exceed either by dividing
an excessive monthly charge into two or more separate items,
2 6
nor by establishing toll stations which charge for each conversa-
tion,27 nor by claiming immunity as patentee of the Federal gov-
ernment.
There appear to be two exceptions to the power of the State to
regulate charges. First, where the nature of the telephone ser-
vice is interstate, a case for Federal control as far as it is a common
carrier of news between States,28 and this question will be of
increasing importance with the use of long-distance telephones.
Secondly, where the State by words of positive grant has trans-
ferred this right, it may be to a municipal corporation, or to the
telephone company, as part of its charter rights.2 9 So jealously
does the law protect this use of the police function that it can only
be bargained away by words of express grant, or their equivalent
in law,30 and where a charter leaves ambiguity on this point the
construction always favors the State. 1
The effect of telephone messages in evidence is still an unset-
tled question. There are as yet no decisions from Federal courts
21 Cooley Const. Lim. 572.
22 Hockett v. State, io5 Ind. 250, and Munn v,. IL., 94 U. S. xi3.
23 94 U. S. z55. 24 Cent. L. J., Vol. 28, 41 note; 94 U. S. 164.
25 Cent. L. J., Vol. 28, 41 note. 2 63 MInd. 143. 27 ri8 Ind. 194.
28 Cent. L. J., Vol. 28. 29 94 U. S. 155, and 9 4 U. S. 164.
80 xx6 U. S. 307, and 96 Mo. 623. 81 116 U. S. 307, and 96 Mo. 623.
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on the subject, and the decisions of State courts are not such as to
carry great weight. The telephone has become so identified with
modern business, and its nature and operation so notorious, that
courts will probably take judicial notice of it as belonging to
public contemporary history.82 This subject seems to naturally
fall under three heads: first, the effect of an ordinary communica-
tion between parties who recognize each other's voices; secondly,
the effect of an answer from a person in an establishment as evi-
dence to bind the proprietor; and thirdly, the effect of a message
transmitted or repeated by an operator. It would seem that the
first case differs in no way from an oral conversation aside from
the question of witnesses thereto.83 Declarations of an interested
party should be admissible against such party, whether made in
person, or through an electrical mechanism whereby the parties
"talk with each other, as if face to face." In People v. Ward, 3
N. Y. Crim. R., 483, 5xi, it was held competent to give in evidence
a message where the voice was recognized.
Secondly, suppose one calls up a business establishment and
receives an answer, but does not recognize the voice as belong-
ing to one of the firm. Is the answer admissible in evidence to
bind the principal? In Wolfe V. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 97 Mo. 413, it
was held that where one by subscribing to a telephone, invited
communication through that channel, he was bound by such con-
versation, even though the voice was not recognized, the latter
fact affecting the weight but not the admissibility of the testi-
mony.34 This opinion rests upon the principle of agency, and not
being from a court of highest authority, does not settle the law on
this point, although it seems very properly to favor the interests
of business by giving effect in evidence to answers made in the
usual manner from a usual place of business. And yet, a general
rule of evidence binding a principal by all answers given by tele-
phone from his office would seem too sweeping, so that, until the
higher courts pass upon the matter, each case ought to be settled
according to its peculiar circumstances.
The third case in this connection arises when an operator
acts as an intermediator between parties, and the increasing
use of the long.distance telephone, over which it is often impossi-
ble to communicate with an ordinary transmitter, makes it a
question of no small importance. Here again the cases are few
and of doubtful authority. Two cases 5 have held such communi-
3297 Mo. 473. 33 24 Weekly L. Bull. 245.
34 See also 82 Tex. 2oi.
35 Sullivan v. Kuykendall, 82 Ky. 483, and Oskamp v. Gadsden, 35 Neb. 7.
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cations admissible on the ground that the operator was acting as
the agent of both parties. There is some objection to considering
that person the agent of the party called up, unless that party
could hear the message repeated.
3 6 How the operator can be con-
sidered the agent of the party called up when he does not know
that he is conversing through a third party, so as to bind him by
statements incorrectly repeated, is difficult to understand. The
law of evidence will not regard a party as bound by the statements
of a third party, unless he has referred others to him for informa-
tion as in case of interpreters. If he heard it repeated, and either
party would 'generally be able to in long-distance messages, his
acquiescence would amount to adoption. Evidence so transmitted
should go to the jury and have much or little weight, according to
the circumstances. There is an analogy here to the case of the tele-
graph company which is ordinarily considered the agent of the
sender. The law of telephonic evidence will probably remain
embryonic until further developments have revealed all the pos-
sibilities of long-distance telephones.
The validity of official acts by telephone is an even more spec-
ulative question than the admission of telephone messages in evi-
dence. But there are the same reasons for a liberal interpretation
of such acts, and one which will facilitate rather than hamper the
transaction of official business. In Banning v. Banning, 8o Cal.
2 71, it was held competent for a notary to take an acknowledg-
ment of a deed by telephone, and in the absence of fraud, duress,
or mistake, it was held conclusive evidence of the facts stated
therein. In Murphy v. Jack,3 7 one of the departments of the Su-
preme Court of New York held that an attorney in the City of New
York might make a good affidavit for an attachment based upon
information and belief, the information having been derived from
his client communicating with him through a long-distance tele-
phone from Boston,-and this, although he did not recognize the
voice of the client. This recent opinion, coming from the New
York Supreme Court, will doubtless have much weight in future
decisions on the subject.
It is imprudent to attempt to apply the law to new conditions
until they are thoroughly understood, and, while these two cases
are doubtless rightly found on their facts, the final determination
of this and other questions will come when the telephone takes its
place with the railroad and telegraph as a settled institution.
Herbert H. Kellogg.
37 io N. Y. Law Journal, No. 146.36 4 Ami. L. Reg. 442, note.
